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Abstract. Simulating emotions within a group of agents has been shown to support
co-operation in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Most work on simulating these emo-
tions has focused on environments where the agents do not move, that is, they are
static and their neighbours are fixed. However, it has also been shown in other work
that when an agent is given the ability to move, then the type of the environment
affects how co-operation evolves in the group of agents. In this paper, we investi-
gate the combination of these two ideas in an experimental study that explores the
effects on co-operation when autonomous agents that can show emotions are given
the ability to move within structured environments. We observe that once mobility
is introduced, different strategies become successful. Successful strategies respond
quickly to defection, while not immediately reciprocating co-operation, regardless
of the environment type. The further an agent travels, the higher its average pay-
off in a small world environment. The slower an agent is to copy another agent by
imitating its strategy, the higher its increase in average payoff.
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1. Introduction
It is well known in psychology that emotions affect human decision making [1]. Recently,
it has been shown that simulating emotions within autonomous agents (which we refer
to as emotional agents throughout the paper) can similarly influence the evolution of co-
operation within the prisoner’s dilemma game [2,3]. So far, the work on emotional agents
and their co-operation has focused on static agents which do not have mobility. In related
work, Ranjbar-Sahraei et al. have shown that when agents (without emotions) are given
mobility, the environment type has a clear influence on the evolution of co-operation in
the prisoner’s dilemma game [4].
In this work, we combine previous efforts by giving simulated emotional agents the
opportunity to move around in the environment, and therefore allowing them to interact
with many other agents over time. We examine whether the environment structure has the
same effect on emotional agents as it does on non-emotional agents. By giving our agents
mobility we aim to give a more accurate description of the evolution of co-operation than
within simulated emotional agents, in a multi-agent setting.
Whilst we recognise that emotions have both psychological and physiological
grounds [5], we consider only the former in this paper. We will simulate the functional
1Corresponding author: email: j.m.collenette@liverpool.ac.uk
aspect of emotions, to the effect that emotions can change the current behaviour of the
agents, such as anger driving a pacifist to fight [6]. It is important here to make clear the
distinction made in the psychology literature between mood and emotion since they are
closely related. Emotions are short-term feelings that are directed towards a particular
object or person [6]. Mood in contrast is a long term feeling which does not have this
focus on a particular object or person [7]. In this paper we will focus purely on this short-
term and directed characterisation of emotions, which defines the scope that an emotion
has within our agents.
Our study addresses two main questions. Firstly, does the addition of emotions in-
fluence the way in which the environment affects the evolution of co-operation? To an-
swer this question we compare our findings with those obtained by Ranjbar-Sahraei et
al. [4] for mobile but non-emotional agents. Secondly, how do mobility and the envi-
ronment type affect the simulated emotions and the resulting evolution of co-operation?
This second question directly contrasts our work to that of Lloyd-Kelly et al. [3] who
looked at emotional but static agents. As such, our work highlights the interplay between
emotions and mobility, as well as their joint influence on co-operation within a society
of self-interested decision makers. The main purpose of this work is to better understand
how emotions influence interactions and decision making.
We will consider two different types of environments: a regular environment, and a
small-world environment. The regular environment is grid-like, as all intersections have
the same number of exits. This means that agents need to move long distances to interact
with agents on the other side of the map. The small-world environment is similar to the
regular environment, but contains shortcuts for agents to move over to different parts of
the map quickly. This reduces the average distance between any pair of agents, in similar
fashion to the small-world networks of Watts and Strogatz [8].
In our environments we will be simulating small disc shaped robots, and we will be
using the player/stage simulator [9]. We are simulating robots rather than mathematical
models of graph-based interactions, as this naturally allows to emulate a number of inter-
esting properties such as asynchronous interactions, dynamic neighbourhoods, and dif-
fering rates of interaction between agents. We simulate these properties to better under-
stand how mobility affects co-operation in a realistic setting. We anticipate these results
will inform a broader study on designing multi-agent systems with desirable properties
related to agent co-operation.
2. Related Work
There are various ways in which researchers have introduced emotions into a computa-
tional framework. These frameworks vary from implementations of emotions in a logic
[10] to more practical applications in human-computer interaction [11]. Most works use
the OCC (Ortony, Clore and Collins) model of emotions [12] as the base for their imple-
mentation, although this is not the only model of emotions [13]. We use the OCC model
in this work due to its accepted use in agent-based systems as well as its flexibility in
implementation. Lloyd-Kelly et al. explore how these emotions influence co-operation
in multi-agent interactions [2,3]. However, their work is limited to static agents, in the
sense that agents always interact with the same opponent. We build on the work of Lloyd-
Kelly et al. by considering a system of mobile agents, equipped with emotions, which
Table 1. Payoff matrix of the prisoner’s dilemma.
CO-OP DEFECT
CO-OP 3, 3 0, 5
DEFECT 5, 0 1, 1
interact with different partners over time, and study how mobility affects the evolution
of co-operation in different types of environments.
In recent work, Ranjbar-Sahraei et al. show how co-operation evolves within a so-
ciety of mobile agents [4]. The authors simulate robots in two types of environments,
regular and small-world. However, in their work they do not consider the effect of emo-
tions. We base our simulation model on the work of Ranjbar-Sahraei et al., while incor-
porating the emotional characters of Lloyd-Kelly et al., allowing to compare our results
directly to theirs while simultaneously being able to isolate the effect of both emotions
and mobility.
A large body of related work deals with the evolution of co-operation in (social) net-
works, in particular in those scenarios where co-operation is costly but ultimately benefi-
cial for all agents, often modelled as the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma [14]. A large body
of work focuses for example on how structural network properties and interaction mech-
anisms determine whether co-operation is sustainable [15,16]. Others have focused on
developing strategies from the ground up that will support co-operation [17,18]. Closely
related is the work of Van Veelen et al., who extensively study a class of “Tit-for-Tat”-
based strategies [19]. Although the emotional characters we consider in the work are
highly related, Van Veelen et al. do not link their strategies to psychological character
traits as we do here, nor do they consider mobility.
We are building on previous works from psychology, game theory, and graph theory.
By adding emotions to social dilemma strategies we can take the first steps into under-
standing how simulated emotions and their differing characteristics interact in establish-
ing co-operation and what outside effects can occur on this co-operation.
3. Method
In the following we will describe how our experiments will be conducted including a
brief introduction to the prisoner’s dilemma game, which is our model of interaction. We
also introduce the different emotional characters used and how agents interact with the
environment and each other.
3.1. Prisoner’s Dilemma
In the prisoner’s dilemma two players have the choice of either defecting or co-operating;
choices are made simultaneously and without prior communication. Both players then
get a payoff depending on the choices made. The payoffs for the game are 3 for each
agent when they both co-operate, 1 for each agent when they both defecting and 5 for
the agent which defects in a non-mutual outcome and 0 for the co-operative agent.
The game matrix is shown in Table 1, with player one choosing a row, player two
choosing a column, and both players receiving the payoff indicated in each cell.
When looking at the prisoner’s dilemma outcomes, it seems in the best interest of
both players to play co-operatively since this would lead to the largest total payoff. How-
Table 2. Emotional characters, as used in this work and previous work [2].
Anger
Threshold
Gratitude
Threshold
Character
Anger
Threshold
Gratitude
Threshold
Character
1 1 Responsive 1 2 Active
1 3 Distrustful 2 1 Accepting
2 2 Impartial 2 3 Non-Accepting
3 1 Trustful 3 2 Passive
3 3 Stubborn
ever, there is a temptation to defect as this can lead to a higher individual payoff. When
both players reason this way, this then leads to the Nash equilibrium of (DEFECT, DE-
FECT), which gives the worst outcome for the group as a whole. This highlights the
dilemma of the game. Investigating methods by which self-interested agents can be made
to co-operate in the prisoner’s dilemma has been an active area of research in the past
decades, with a particular focus on the evolution of co-operation within groups of agents
[14,20]. It is for this reason that we adopt this model of interaction as well.
3.2. Emotional Characters
The simulated emotions we implement are based on the Ortony, Clore and Collins model
of emotions, known as the OCC model [12]. This was developed from psychology re-
search and has been used within the AI community [11,2] to simulate emotions within
agents. The emotions we will be modelling are anger, gratitude and admiration. Our ini-
tial focus is on these emotions as they were the focus of previous work [2,3] and the most
relevant as a starting point in our study.
The OCC model provides 22 emotions that can be modelled; they take the view
that each action is a response from the emotional makeup and that each emotion gives a
different action to take. Since the OCC model describes the actions that an emotion can
lead to rather than how that emotion is processed internally, this gives us a good platform
to implementing the emotions in a computational setting.
Our implementation of these emotions is similar to previous work by [2]. This al-
lows us to compare the differences caused by mobility and environment structure rather
than implementation. Each emotion has a threshold, and when that threshold is reached
it triggers a change in the agent’s behaviour. Specifically, when the anger threshold is
reached the agent changes to defection, and when the gratitude threshold is reached the
agent changes to co-operation. Admiration, when triggered, will cause the agent to take
on the emotional characteristics of the agent that triggered the admiration threshold.
There are a number of emotional characters which have differing thresholds for these
emotions. The full set of characters is shown in Table 2, and are intended to show a range
of characteristics that could reflect a simple simulation of personality differences.
Admiration thresholds can similarly be rated as high (3), medium (2) or low (1) —
these are not listed in the table as they are independent from the emotional character,
and will be detailed later. An agent’s anger increases by one when its opponent defects;
gratitude increases when the opponent co-operates. Admiration increases when the agent
believes that its opponent is performing better than itself (explained further in the next
sub-section). When a threshold is reached, the agent’s behaviour changes as described
above and the value is then reset back to 0.
The agents are placed in a random location initially, while checking that no agents
are placed at the same position. Moreover, the different emotional characters, admiration
thresholds, and initial actions, are distributed randomly and independently among the
agents, given the specific proportions of each for that experiment. Details of the different
scenarios are given in the Experiments section.
3.3. Agent Interactions
The agents are given a random walk behaviour with some basic obstacle avoidance proce-
dures. Each agent has proximity sensors to detect walls and obstacles, located at {−90◦,
−45◦, −15◦, 15◦, 45◦, 90◦} w.r.t. the robot’s heading. If the sensors on the left detect
anything, the agent will stop and then turn to the right, and the reverse for the right sen-
sors. The robot’s speed is set at 10 centimetres per second and can turn at 45 degrees per
second. When no obstacles are detected the agent randomly selects a turn speed between
−45◦ and 45◦ per second while moving forward. Since a new heading is generated each
time the robot receives sensor data this results in a random movement pattern.
The prisoner’s dilemma game is initiated whenever two agents are in close proxim-
ity, and have line of sight of each other. The game is played once, after which they will
then continue their random walk behaviour. The payoffs of the game are given in Sec-
tion 3.1. The agents have no knowledge of these payoffs or the number of games to be
played, and will purely use the strategy given by their emotional character to play. The
agent has no knowledge of the strategies or emotional characters of its neighbours, but it
can differentiate between them, and the emotions it has apply specifically to the agent it
is playing against. The agents have no knowledge of the environment; they will only use
the random walk behaviour driven by their sensor inputs.
In the work of [2], the admiration threshold increases when an agent compares its to-
tal payoff against each of its neighbours every five games. For our agents, the neighbours
are not as well defined because they will be moving constantly, which changes who they
are near to at a particular time. We will instead use a modified version of the trigger for
admiration.
The modified version is that when a mobile agent completes five games of the pris-
oner’s dilemma. After that, the mobile agent will request the average payoff per game of
its next opponent, before the game has started, and compares this value to its own aver-
age payoff. The agent will increase its admiration value towards whoever has the highest
average, this will be either itself or its opponent. We are using average payoff, rather
than total payoff which was used by [2], because we cannot be sure that each mobile
agent has engaged in the same number of games as its opponent. When the admiration
threshold has been reached, then the agent takes on the emotional characteristics of the
agent that triggered the threshold, which may be itself, so the agent will then respond to
other opponents in the same way as the agent who triggered the admiration threshold.
Then the admiration threshold is reset to zero. Finally, the agent plays the game with its
opponent.
The average payoff is obtained directly from the opponent, since we study how
effective these agents are in an ideal situation we force all agents to be truthful. Similarly
the agent will not lie when communicating the emotional characteristics it is currently
inhabiting. Exploring how lying can affect these emotional agents is an interesting topic
but it is out of scope of this paper since we are most interested with isolating the effects
of movement on a mixed group of emotional agents.
Figure 1. The two 5×5 meter environments used in this work.
4. Experimental Setup
We conduct two sets of experiments. First, a validation experiment is designed in order
to check if our implementation reproduces the results obtained by [3] for static agents,
which would allow for a direct comparison. Second, in our main experiment we exten-
sively investigate the effects that mobility and the environment type have on the evolution
of co-operation. In the following we describe the set-up of these two experiments.
4.1. Validation Experiment
The aim of this experiment is to show that our mobile agents have the same emotional
response and outcomes as the static agents reported by [3]. In this experiment we will
only be using the emotions gratitude and anger, as these were the emotions used in the
original experiment [2]. The emotional agents will play the iterated prisoner’s dilemma
against a fixed-strategy agent that does not use emotions. The emotional agents will be
set to co-operate initially. The non-emotional agents have the same knowledge of the
world as the emotional agents. They have the same random walk behaviour and the same
limited knowledge about their neighbours. The fixed strategies that the emotional agents
will be tested against are the traditional ones from Axelrod’s tournament [14] and are
described in [2].
In this experiment there are only two agents in the environment: the emotional agent,
and the fixed-strategy agent. For each emotional character of Table 2 we will perform 10
runs against each fixed strategy in turn. A run consists of simulating the mobile agents
until 200 rounds of the prisoner’s dilemma game have been completed, equal to the set-
up used by [3]. This should make the results identical, up to a slight variation caused by
chance in the Random and Joss strategies. The Joss strategy plays tit-for-tat with a 10%
chance of defection.
4.2. Main Experiment
This experiment aims to highlight the differences and similarities between mobile and
static emotional agents, as well as showing what influence the environment type has on
the outcomes. In addition to the anger and gratitude emotions, here we will also include
the admiration emotion. As in [2], there will be 14 scenarios that will be investigated.
Each scenario is defined by the number of initial defectors and co-operators, and the
number of agents with high, medium, or low admiration thresholds. The first 5 scenarios
have identical admiration threshold distributions, but have varying percentages of ini-
tial actions. The remaining scenarios have varying admiration thresholds but identical
distributions of initial actions. For a break-down of each scenario, see Table 3.
For each of these scenarios there will be a number of sub-scenarios using different
numbers of agents. The number of simulated mobile agents will range from 9 to 144,
Table 3. Scenarios used in the main experiment. Ai is the admiration threshold.
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14
Initial
Defect %
90 70 50 30 10 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Initial
Co-Op %
10 30 50 70 90 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
High Ai% 34 34 34 34 34 50 70 90 25 15 5 25 15 5
Med Ai% 34 34 34 34 34 25 15 5 50 70 90 25 15 5
Low Ai% 32 32 32 32 32 25 15 5 25 15 5 50 70 90
Table 4. Sub-scenarios.
Sub-scenario
No. of
agents
No. of agents per
emotional character
1 - Very low density 9 1
2 - Low density 36 4
3 - Medium density 72 8
4 - High density 144 16
with each emotional character being represented equally in each sub-scenario. For the
break-down of sub-scenarios, see Table 4. We have included these sub-scenarios as we
expect when the number of agents increases the density of the agents will increase, since
the environment is still the same size. We predict that the increased density will prevent
the agents from moving further afield in the environment as other agents will block their
path. We then expect an agent will need to move less to initiate a game, and so give the
agents a higher probability of playing against the same agents more often.
Having an equal distribution of emotional characters initially makes sure that we
test character strength without being affected by characteristics having a initially higher
represention. We will run each combination of scenario and sub-scenario 10 times, and
compute average statistics for each. Each run will last for 10 minutes during which the
agents move around and interact, which allows sufficient interactions and replication
to take place. We expect Trustful to be the most dominant characteristic as in previous
work [2] however as mobility is introduced we expect some changes in lower rankings
due to agents playing against a larger range of characteristics. This will show us that
while mobility does affect the characteristics, high performing characteristics should be
affected to a minor extent.
5. Results
5.1. Validation Results
We investigate how our emotional characters perform against the static strategies dis-
cussed. To compare our results to those in [3], we focus on the Responsive and Trustful
characters2 as they are characters whose individual scores were reported. The results of
this experiment show that our agents do indeed react in the same way. We observe that
2Characters Responsive and Trustful are referred to as E1 and E7 respectively in [3]
Table 5. The mutual outcomes that occur between two agents i and j with differing initial actions, where Ii
is mutual co-operation or defection depending on the initial action of agent i. C is mutual co-operation, D is
mutual defection and R is a repeated loop of (COOP,DEFECT ) then (DEFECT,COOP).
Character 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Responsive (1) R D D C I j I j C I j I j
Active (2) D D D R D D C I j I j
Distrustful (3) D D D D D D R D D
Accepting (4) C R D C C I j C C I j
Impartial (5) Ii D D C R D C C I j
Non-Accepting (6) Ii D D Ii D D C R D
Trustful (7) C C R C C C C C C
Passive (8) Ii Ii D C C R C C C
Stubborn (9) Ii Ii D Ii Ii D C C R
against agents which do not have randomness, our mobile agents perform identically to
their static counterparts. Against agents which have randomness introduced (Random
and Joss), we can see that the average payoffs between the two types of agent are close,
and that all of them have the same winners. This shows that our mobile agents react in
the same way as their static counterparts, and that our results will be directly comparable.
5.2. Main Results
When we look at the interactions between pairs of agents there are a number of patterns
that emerge between them. When two agents start with identical initial actions the result
of the game will be continued mutual co-operation or defection without deviation. When
the initial actions are different then a number of different patterns emerge. The agents
will play a series of (COOP,DEFECT ) cycles then after a number of interactions turn
to mutual defection or co-operation and then continue this indefinitely. The agents may
under certain conditions continue this (COOP,DEFECT ) cycle indefinitely without set-
tling on a mutual action between them. The mutual action they choose is dependant on
a number of conditions, namely their gratitude and anger thresholds, but it may also de-
pend on the their opponent’s thresholds. We will now define what the conditions are for
each mutual outcome that can occur.
To show the mutual outcome they will produce indefinitely, we define Ωi, j to return
this mutual action where i and j are emotional agents, Ai is the anger threshold of agent
i and Gi is the gratitude threshold of agent i. Aci returns the current action of agent i.
Ω ji =

COOP, If (Aci = Ac j =COOP) or (Aci =COOP and G j < Ai)
DEFECT, If (Aci = Ac j = DEFECT ) or (Aci = DEFECT and A j < Gi)
NotMutual, If Ai = G j and Gi = A j
Ωij Otherwise
Table 5 shows what the mutual actions will be between our emotional characteristics
when paired against each other. This table also shows us that when two agents are paired
against each other and they have differing initial actions, they are more likely to settle
into mutual defection.
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Figure 2. The percentage of games each characteristic was most dominant excluding draws, for all scenarios.
5.2.1. Dominant Characteristic
When we look at Table 5 we can see that the Trustful agent has almost all outcomes end
in mutual co-operation, we then expect this characteristic to be the most dominant as
this would give the highest average when compared to the other types of agent, which
reflects our hypothesis and previous work [2]. However when we look at Figure 2, which
shows which characteristics are dominant, we can see that Trustful is not only not the
most dominant, but is consistently the worst performing agent in our experiments. This
shows us that the environment does have an effect when compared to static agents, but
the effect between environments is much smaller.
The reason behind Trustful’s failure comes down to the fact that it takes a long
time to settle into its mutual outcomes. Trustful will take up to three defections before
it changes the opponent to co-operation and with the average number of interactions
between two specific agents only being 3.37 (Standard Deviation 10.71) then the agent
is unlikely to settle into mutual co-operation during the run. Active’s success is due to
its ability to be on the side that receives a payoff in (COOP,DEFECT ) outcomes. When
it is on the receiving end of the sucker-punch, the agent punishes defection immediately,
and so settles into mutual defection preventing the agent from receiving more than one
zero payoff from its opponent.
Responsive is affected by responding to co-operation too quickly as it is unable to
boost its score over time with the sucker-punches. While it may appear that Distrustful
should therefore do well, the agent cannot get into mutual co-operation as the number
of interactions is long enough for mutual co-operation to occur which brings its average
score down. The Active characteristic differs from the Distrustful agent as it can get
into these mutual co-operation cycles quickly raising the Active agent’s average payoff.
Impartial can take an advantage from other agents and can get into co-operation cycles
quickly, however to achieve this it is open to being taken advantage of, lowering its
average score.
5.2.2. Density Effects
When we look at the average scores of an agent in differing densities as shown in Table 6
we can see that the payoff is initially small with a large variance. Increasing the density
lowers the standard deviation. The reasoning behind this is clearer when we look at how
many interactions each agent expects to get in these densities, which is shown in Table 7.
In very low densities the agents are only going to get one or two interactions which
prevents them settling on an outcome and since there are so few games there is a large
disparity in the results as very few agents can respond to their opponent’s actions.
Table 6. Average Scores (Standard Deviation) for
all agents across all scenarios for varying number of
agents.
Regular Small World
9 1.64 (1.41) 1.24 (1.43)
36 2.04 (0.46) 2.01 (0.57)
72 2.03 (0.29) 2.11 (0.29)
144 2.02 (0.17) 2.08 (0.18)
Table 7. Average number of interactions (Standard
Deviation) between specific agents for varying num-
ber of agents.
Average Number
Of Interactions
9 1.56 (0.83)
36 1.92 (1.93)
72 2.15 (1.73)
144 3.13 (15.08)
Table 8. Average payoff (Standard Deviation) for an agent per interaction based on distance travelled in a
small-world environment.
Sub-Scenario 3 Sub-Scenario 4
High 2.11 (0.06) 2.13 (0.09)
Medium 2.05 (0.06) 2.10 (0.09)
Low 1.97 (0.11) 2.02 (0.07)
When the density increases and the number of interactions increases as well we can
see the variance in average scores becomes much closer, however it is slowly falling.
When the number of interactions is very high the agents will settle into their mutual
outcomes with the majority being mutual co-operation or defection, whereas in slightly
lower densities they have not settled, leading to a majority of mixed outcomes. When half
of the agents are in mutual co-operation and the other in mutual defection, the overall
average will be 2, but the mixed outcome average will be around 2.5, showing the slight
dip in the average scores in higher densities.
There is a large variance in the number of interactions in higher densities so we con-
sidered how this can affect the average score when we based this on distance travelled.
We split the agents into three groups of roughly the same size and categorised the high
movers as having moved 30 meters or more, medium as between 15 and 30, and low as
15 or less. The scores can be seen in Table 8. The table shows that the more an agent
moves the higher the average score. When movement is high the number of repeated in-
teractions decreases leading to these agents not settling on their mutual outcomes, which
is the reverse for the low movers. When the number of interactions is low we have seen
that the average score is slightly higher and this is again reflected by the distance moved.
5.2.3. Environment Effects
The environment has add a larger effect than expected, so we have examined more closely
what effects it has. When we look at Figure 3, we can see that the more co-operators
there are, the bigger the payoffs and that differing admiration thresholds do not have a
significant effect on total payoffs. However we do see a difference in environment; this is
due to the fact that small world environments have a larger surface area than our regular
environment, and as we have seen previously there are less interactions between specific
agents in lower densities. As the density is lowered we expect that the average score
should also increase. Using scenario 3, as it has equal distributions in each category,
the average score (Standard Deviation) of the regular environment is 2.02 (0.22) and
the small world environment is 2.12 (0.10). We again see that repeated interactions are
lowered the more average score increases.
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S1
0
S1
1
S1
2
S1
3
S1
4
1
1.5
·105
To
ta
lS
co
re
Regular environment Small-world environment
Figure 3. Total scores for each scenario
Table 9. Average payoff (Standard Deviation) per
game for an agent based on distribution of admiration
thresholds in both environments.
Regular Small World
S8 (High) 2.09 (0.05) 2.26 (0.12)
S11 (Medium) 1.97 (0.16) 2.16 (0.03)
S14 (Low) 2.10 (0.11) 1.91 (0.02)
Table 10. Breakdown of interactions in both envi-
ronments across all runs.
Regular Small World
Total Interactions 417372 361682
Unique Interactions 115261 115653
Percentage Unique 28 32
Table 9 shows the average scores for scenarios 8, 11 and 14 which have differing
admiration thresholds. We see that the regular environment is relatively stable whereas
the small world environment shows a drop in scores from high to low thresholds. The
difference is due to the percentage of unique interactions in each environment, which is
shown in Table 10. In small world environments we see that agents interact with individ-
ual agents less often. When they come to replicate using their admiration thresholds, the
chance of them replicating into a characteristic which is not dominant is increased. This
is due to the average scores not reflecting the performance of a characteristic accurately;
this then prevents them achieving higher scores.
6. Conclusions & Future Work
We have investigated the evolution of co-operation in mobile emotional agents. Our ex-
periments have shown that the distance travelled, the type of environment and the density
of the agents all have an effect on the success of the agents. This is due to how these
affect the number of unique interactions. The environment type affects which strategies
are viable, with the Stubborn character being successful in a regular environment, but
not as successful in a small world environment. However, strategies exist that do well
regardless of the environment type, such as the Active character.
In answer to our questions posed in the introduction, we have shown that mobility
and environment types do affect the simulated emotional agents, and as a result different
emotional characters become more successful as compared to those of [3] which was
an unexpected result as it shows that mobility has a large effect on the success of a
characteristic. This answers our second question. In answer to the first question, we have
seen that in regular environments payoffs increase with more co-operators, as also shown
by [4]. In contrast, in the small-world environment, [4] found payoffs decreasing with
the addition of co-operators, whereas we see an increase. While we also see effects of
environment type further investigation will provide more evidence of these effects. An
interesting prospect for future work is the addition of moods to our agents, to see whether
this can improve co-operation. We are also interested in investigating the effect of state
interventions on co-operation levels within a society of agents.
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